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abstract. Mind takes place in the world, and that matters. We are bodies among bodies, and, no matter what we think, what we do 
is a matter of where. And thinking about where is a problem for architecture. Richard Luecke’s pithy summary of Aristotle’s Politics 
was that we go to the city to live but stay to live the good life. The interplay of going and staying takes up a critical theme of Aristotle’s 
work. To understand the world, he said, we must understand both motion and stasis – not the going alone but the staying that takes 
place in the middle of it. Luecke took up William James’s figure of perchings in the flight of a bird and put it to work in thinking 
about cities. The city is a perch for the winged thing we are. To understand our flight, we must also attend to our perching. Aristotle 
speaks of the city as a place to go and a place to stay, but he also speaks of it as a koinonia turned toward good. That marks it as being 
human. Aristotle directs our attention to the necessity of the city (we go to live) and to its good (we stay to live the good life). But 
the staying, the dwelling, is understood within a structure of action: the good is that toward which all things aim. Dwelling, still, 
we turn. Which qualifies the going, because we are political animals. Going to the city to live, we go nowhere other than where we 
are. The city is the form of human presence.
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Theme of the issue “Architecture and the environment: ethical aspects”
Žurnalo numerio tema „Architektūra ir aplinka: etiniai aspektai“
Aber der Mensch, das ist kein abstraktes, außer der Welt 
hockendes Wesen. Der Mensch, das ist die Welt des 
Menschen, Staat, Sozietät. Dieser Staat, diese Sozietät 
produzieren die Religion, ein verkehrtes Weltbewußtsein, 
weil sie eine verkehrte Welt sind. Die Religion ist 
die allgemeine Theorie dieser Welt, ihr enzyklopädisches 
Kompendium, ihre Logik in populärer Form, ihr spir-
itualistischer Point-d`honneur, ihr Enthusiasmus, ihre 
moralische Sanktion, ihre feierliche Ergänzung, ihr 
allgemeiner Trost- und Rechtfertigungsgrund. Sie ist 
die phantastische Verwirklichung des menschlichen 
Wesens, weil das menschliche Wesen keine wahre 
Wirklichkeit besitzt. Der Kampf gegen die Religion ist 
also mittelbar der Kampf gegen jene Welt, deren geistiges 
Aroma die Religion ist (Marx 2007).
Marx had Hegel in mind when he went to work on the 
work of religion, which he saw as being architectonic 
in the way Aristotle seems to have seen politics being. 
It is no wonder he devoted considerable time to out-
ing him – out of his mind into the world, with good 
reason. He was, you know, there already: a particu-
lar mind is no place for a maker of general theories. 
There is no place for a mind to be but in the world, 
where the theory and its maker must be as well. Marx 
turned his attention (and called the attention of any-
one within earshot who might be inclined to listen) 
to the absurdity of making mansions (to borrow an 
image from Kierkegaard), then squatting in gatehouses 
when it is time to move in, being on edge after making 
a scene thinking oneself outside.
It is not the posture but the appearance of abstract 
being outside the world that catches his eye and inspires 
his critical judgement. In the act, he says, in the world 
acting. Which calls our attention not only to the world 
acting but – more specifically – to the world acting in 
the presence of humanity. 
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In the presence – the presencing – of humanity, the 
location, the direction, and the state of human being 
in the world. In a manner of speaking, it turns on an 
architecture. 
We begin as embodied beings with a capacity for 
language. 
As embodied beings, we possess a capacity to trans-
form the world. More exactly, we cannot not transform 
the world. By being in the world, we make an object of 
it and being in it. We make the world a world of objects. 
That we are beings with a capacity for language is an 
aspect of our propensity to exchange. We can not not ex-
change: if we were closed to the world entirely, we would 
simply cease to be. We may fancy ourselves unique in 
this, but it is a common feature of organism. It is what 
an organism is, because it is what an organism does. 
Among the things that we exchange are the objects 
that result from our acting in (and on) the world – but 
also (as Adam Smith notes) the capacity to objectify – 
i.e. our labor (Smith 1976). 
Value is a product of our objectification of the 
world. As Smith would have it, wealth derives from 
ownership of labor, which is the only source of value. 
As embodied beings, we take place – we occupy 
space. Owning our labor, we stake a claim to the space 
we occupy: we come to be concrete beings squatting, 
in a manner of speaking, in the world. Taking place, 
we think we have bodies that occupy space. The object, 
we think, is to occupy space. That calls our attention to 
the architecture of the spaces we occupy: we are preoc-
cupied with architecture. 
 When Marx thinks religion, he smells a rat – and 
therein lies a critical hint of the particular state of hu-
man being in the world. A general theory of the world 
rises out of practice in beings with a propensity to lan-
guage. It is the aroma of human being in a place, and it 
is one of the most reliable ways to get a taste of the place. 
The taste of the place, in turn, is a reliable indicator of 
where desire there will turn. And that to which desire 
turns is what is thought to be good. 
Not, mind you, what is good, but what is thought 
to be good. And this brings us to the heart of the prob-
lem for ethics. When we speak of the good we seek 
(as we do when we do ethics), we speak as though we 
think we speak of the good. But if we speak of what we 
seek, we speak of what we think is good: the object of 
our language is a thought that depends on a “we,” an 
abstraction of an abstraction. Making a scene, we are 
tempted to think ourselves outside; we are tempted to 
the gatehouse. 
What we take to be concrete action turns on turning 
toward an abstraction from an abstraction, and so the 
we and that which it thinks good turn us. The focus of 
ethics is not an I acting but the we in which I act and 
that which it thinks good. The I, the we, and that which 
it thinks good are all products of thought and language. 
We might say in the beginning is the act; but in the act 
of saying we turn to word. It is a world of words to the 
end of it (Goethe 1997; Stevens 2011). 
We are not beings who possess a capacity for lan-
guage, but beings who live in language – creatures 
whose being takes place in language. Not in the begin-
ning was the word or in the beginning was the act but 
being always in the act in the middle of a world of words. 
Now. What do we make of this? What do we mean by 
this “we” we say is making? And what is the “this” of 
which we say we make (making that here now in the 
process, which will become this there then for an other)? 
Dwelling on thought and language, we space out. 
Mind takes place in the world, and that matters. We are 
bodies among bodies, and, no matter what we think, 
what we do is a matter of where. And thinking about 
where is a problem for architecture (Taussig 1993). 
Richard Luecke’s pithy summary of Aristotle’s 
Politics was that we go to the city to live but stay to live 
the good life. The interplay of going and staying takes 
up a critical theme of Aristotle’s work that distills the 
critical conversation for which we remember classical 
Greek thinking and gives it a way into the future – in-
cluding our present. To understand the world, he said, 
with an eye on Herakleitos and Parmenides, we must 
understand both motion or change and stasis – not 
the going alone but the staying that takes place in the 
middle of it. Luecke took up William James’s figure of 
perchings in the flight of a bird (which James used to 
illustrate the way the mind works) and put it to work 
in thinking about cities. The city, we might say, is a 
perch for the winged thing we are. To understand our 
flight, we must also attend to our perching. More im-
portantly, successful flight needs places to light (Luecke 
1972; Aristotle 1932; James 1918). 
Aristotle speaks of the city as a place to go and 
a place to stay, but he also speaks of it as a koinonia 
turned toward good. That marks it as being human. 
Aristotle directs our attention to the necessity of the 
city (we go to live) and to its good (we stay to live the 
good life). But the staying, the dwelling, is understood 
within a structure of action: the good is that toward 
which all things aim. Dwelling, still, we turn. 
Which qualifies the going, because we are political 
animals. Going to the city to live, we go nowhere other 
than where we are. 
The city is the form of human presence. It is (to 
borrow an image from Miller Williams) the human 
shaped hole we make in the grass circling the way a dog 
circles to get comfortable (Williams 1999). 
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We make a disastrous mistake when we separate 
“city” from “country.” Wherever there is human pres-
ence – even passing through (as I suspect we always 
are), there is city. The visible city is the human interface 
with (the rest of) the world. 
And that is why, in Aristotle’s terms, politics is an 
architectonic science – not because it is an externally 
imposed constraint on human behavior but because it 
is the shape human being takes in the world. The polis 
is the human shaped hole we make in the grass when we 
settle into comfort (and anyone who has given Aristotle 
even a passing glance knows that “we” implies “they” 
and that “our” getting comfortable often makes “them” 
uncomfortable). Politics is the settling that makes the 
polis. Ethics is a language of means and ends, a lan-
guage of limits, within that science: the good is that at 
which all things aim (ends), but the practical question 
is what is needed to get there (means) (Deng Xiaoping’s 
theory of cats comes to mind: it doesn’t matter if it’s 
a black cat or a white cat. If it catches a mouse, it’s a 
good cat. But Chairman Deng neglected to mention 
that mice, too, stay in the city to live a good life – which 
complicates the question of the good cat in ways that 
matter for builders of cities). 
We do not possess a capacity for language. We live 
in language. Language is where we are at home if we 
are at home at all, and that is critical if “our” city is to 
do more than crush the local grass until “we” move 
elsewhere to make ourselves at home again. 
This poses two central questions that we might 
take as guiding principles for the design of cities: how 
do we welcome strangers? and how do we behave as 
guests? The questions are two sides of one coin; and 
they make the central concern for city planning not 
resilience (though that is likely to be a side effect) but 
hospitality. For concrete beings squatting in the world, 
this is a central concern. 
Fresh in my mind as I write this is a conversation 
with a friend that circulated around our different 
experiences of the midwestern United States (which, 
as Bob Dylan reminds me, is – by the usual defini-
tion – the city I come from) and her description of 
New York City as “sparkling.” I have no doubt that 
New York City sparkles (though I am acquainted with 
many people who would not use that term to describe 
the city). And it is certainly a leading candidate for 
the title of paradigmatic 20th century city of light – 
light that undeniably makes us (as “we” are usually 
defined) – want to go. 
And when I think along those lines, my mind goes 
to the question not only of the going but also of the 
gone. A sparkling city that prides itself on never sleep-
ing (whether that is New York, Rio, Shanghai, London, 
Paris, or any of the other candidates at hand) is a prob-
lem for winged things with a touch of phototropism. 
The 20th century experience of sparkling cities that 
never sleep has perhaps (depending on what we mean 
by we) made us more comfortable in the 21st. But it 
has had disastrous consequences for those outside the 
circle of “we.” 
I find myself in Chicago between the sparkling city 
and the dispersed city of the plains (as Harris Stone 
called the middle of the United States), and I think I 
am in the middle of a single city, a city that has not 
stopped to think since the industrial revolution began 
(Stone 1998). 
Now is as good a time as any. 
Sparkling cities that do not sleep spawned expand-
ing circles of suburbs intended to do nothing but. And 
they did this in tandem with super-States that flattened 
the world into a single global Market. The patch of grass 
we have flattened circling to make ourselves comfort-
able, it seems, is the entire planet. 
Between the lines of Aristotle’s discourses on nat-
ural slaves and barbarians, we can read an interest-
ing argument that might be useful as we light on this 
particular perch. The circle of we that marks the tan-
gible form of one city also draws what looks from here 
like an other: this and that, the city that sparkles and 
everything else. This matters; that is matter to be used 
and/or space to be occupied. 
The impulse where I grew up is to get as far away 
from that bloody city as possible (going the other way, 
like Jonah, when Nineveh calls). What has slowly 
dawned on me after decades of living in between is 
that this is the same impulse that drives all those sleepy 
people from the sparkling city to widen the circles of 
their suburbs until all is sub to that sleepless urb. Jonah, 
by the way, is a good joke (and it was Dick Luecke who 
taught me this as well) because when the prophet runs 
away from the bloody city he finds himself treading 
water to avoid drowning in the ocean of it. Political an-
imals we are. We can run but we can’t hide. So the chal-
lenge – and this is a challenge for which vines withering 
where prophets go looking for shady places to watch 
bloody cities go up in smoke may mean something to 
architects interested in making good our stays in cities 
for which they are making plans. 
So – six suggestions: 
Make no little plans, as Daniel Burnham said, but 
keep in mind that even the big plans are little. It is all 
politics, and all politics is local. 
You can run, but you cannot hide. If you are human, 
you live in the city. 
Successful flight requires places to light. People will 
always fly from a city in which they cannot rest. 
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There are no eternal cities, so there is no reason to 
try to build one. Because we are human, we live in the 
city. But because every city is human, every city will die. 
This is no more the center of the universe than that. 
We are all squatters here, on the way from one there 
to another. 
On the way, we are nomads. Our stopping places 
will always be places that do not belong to us where 
others will also pitch their tents. The city must be hos-
pitable and accommodating, a party, yes, but also a 
sanctuary. 
I have been writing under the influence of Aristotle, 
so I am acutely aware of the importance of posing the 
problem clearly and accurately. That small step is more 
than half the journey, and it is particularly important 
where symptoms threaten to overshadow the problem 
itself. In this case, the most glaring symptoms – evid-
ence that there is a problem – are urban sprawl and 
deepening tension between urban and rural popula-
tions (marked in part by the movement of rural youth 
to urban centers, which effectively transforms them 
into raw material for urban expansion). One effect of 
the deepening tension is a sense of disempowerment 
that adds fuel to the fire. There is also an experience of 
fragmentation within individuals as well as between 
populations. In places like China, there is a growing 
instability (and – just as important – fear of instability) 
that has an immediate and lasting effect on the disposi-
tion of power. This may not be so obvious in the United 
States or Europe, but it is no less present. All of these 
symptoms have an urgency about them that prompts 
immediate and often repressive response. That, in 
turn, exacerbates the symptoms. Given the evidence 
of a problem afforded by the symptoms, the question 
is not (yet) what is to be done? The question (for now) 
is what is the problem? 
The problem is not the existence of sparkling cities 
that do not sleep. It is not the existence of high density 
urban centers within the human experience of being 
in the world – within the city. It is the flattening of 
the world that follows from a particular way of center-
ing power – a widening gyre that flattens everything 
in sight. New York sparkles; but when Santa Fe, New 
Mexico, or Marfa, Texas, begins to resemble a New 
York suburb, we are in danger  of losing our soul – not 
because Marfa or Santa Fe is better than New York but 
because they are different. And in losing the difference 
we lose the form that gives shape to the whole. This is 
not new to those who have experienced the colonial-
ism that has gone hand in hand with the emergence of 
mega-cities and super-States. And I think one salutary 
response for architects planning cities might be to look 
again at anti-colonialist theories from Franz Fanon to 
Enrique Dussel. Dussel in particular makes a point of 
listening for voices from the other side (and we should 
bear in mind that every side is other to some other 
other) (Dussel 2003). 
Practically, I think this points in two seemingly 
contradictory directions. First, it demands careful at-
tention to the preservation of “outside” – not as theme 
park or wilderness but as a dimension of city, of human 
being in the world. And, second, it demands that this 
“outside” turn and invade the supposed center – not as 
theme park but as living presence. 
Even the most ardent partisans of sparkling New 
York will allow that it is not one city. At the very least, 
it is five – as anyone who lives in Brooklyn, Queens, 
the Bronx, or Staten Island can tell you. The sparkling 
city that thinks itself center is Manhattan – and it has 
something to offer 21st century city thinking. 
The paradox of the invasion of the outside I sugges-
ted a moment ago is that it calls for greater density as a 
corrective to sprawl. The urban centers that result are 
likely to look more like Manhattan or Hong Kong than 
the linear cities characteristic of 20th century urban 
sprawl (for which Shenzhen could be the poster child). 
The challenge for architects, I think, is to knock the 
legs of necessary expansion for lebensraum out from 
under the global city and its development. That means 
mixed use zoning and development that makes it pos-
sible for people to stay rather than necessary for them 
to retreat from the place where they work during the 
two thirds of their time reserved for rest and what you 
will. Retreating has given the global city its shape, and 
the challenge is to reshape it around being here, not 
elsewhere. 
Paradoxically, this requires mobility with min-
imal destructive impact – and that means reinvent-
ing transportation in an image other than the private 
automobile. That is not to be accomplished by dropping 
bicycle lanes on top of an urban grid determined by 
automobiles. It requires breaking the grid. 
And that means, among other things, challenging 
the illusion of permanence while embracing the fact of 
more people in no more space – increasing density. If 
we are all nomads squatting in the material world, then 
the material design of shelter should make it more, not 
less, accessible to more, not fewer, people. Expanding 
public space as sanctuary right in the middle of urban 
concentration, reasserting the commons – not occupy-
ing it as a matter of ownership but being at home as 
stranger and guest. 
When rich and powerful people occupy tempor-
ary shelter (hotel rooms, e.g.), a vast machinery is put 
into play to make them feel at home. What sort of ma-
chinery might make that happen in temporary public 
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spaces? And what if we considered “temporary” and 
“public” to be the norm for spaces in which humanity 
takes place? 
If you see something say something, I hear them say 
every time I take a train. Every time I take a train, I see 
something else. And seeing something even when I am 
looking for nothing, I am pleased to imagine saying 
nothing a subversive act. Nothing will ever be the 
same, and that may be the stasis around which a res 
publica can circle without making the whole world 
flat. Pitching a tent, not erecting a temple, we make 
a scene – and when we leave, it is as though we were 
never there. 
No abstract outside the world squatting being – but 
being concrete squatting in the world, flying, lighting 
now and then on a sparkling city, still turning toward 
good, turning.
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